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ABSTRACT
This study aims to identify the hiring overview of the non-profit private sector by the Brazilian 
National Health System (SUS) to perform medium and high complexity health services in hospital 
care and its relationship with the SUS decentralization guideline, which must guarantee assistance 
from large urban centers to areas where public services are most scarce. In this regard, it question 
whether the expanded hiring of private hospital services represents a departure from the national 
and state directorates of the execution of health services from the generalized municipalization of 
health services. The research methodology is exploratory and descriptive, based on the literature 
of Health and Administrative Law. Especially from the analysis of public expenditure on hospital 
services, collected from the Department Informatics of the National Health System, in the last 
five years, it is identified that non-profit entities had more investment in hospital production 
than the direct and indirect public administration spheres of all entities. As a contribution to the 
search for solutions to the problem, it is concluded that the smaller participation of the national 
management of the SUS  in the provision of health services leads to greater purchase of private 
services sector by the entities, disregarding the constitutional determination of complement the 
participation of the private sector in the SUS. In addition, the provision of hospital services in 
this way promotes the lack of balance in the allocation of hospital beds, which compromises 
equal conditions in access to health actions and services, the objective of decentralization, and 
the proper functioning of the SUS.
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RESUMO
Este trabalho objetiva identificar o panorama de contratação do setor privado sem fins lucrativos 
pelo Sistema Único de Saúde para realização de serviços de saúde de média e alta complexidade 
em atenção hospitalar, e a relação desse panorama com a diretriz de descentralização do Sistema 
Único de Saúde, que deve garantir atendimentos desde os grandes centros urbanos até as zonas 
onde os serviços públicos são mais escassos. Nesse aspecto, questiona se a contratação expandida 
de serviços hospitalares privados representa um afastamento das direções nacional e estadual da 
execução dos serviços de saúde a partir da municipalização generalizada de serviços de saúde. A 
metodologia de pesquisa é exploratória e descritiva, com base bibliográfica na literatura do Direito 
Sanitário e do Direito Administrativo. Especialmente a partir da análise dos gastos públicos com 
serviços hospitalares, colhidos do Departamento de Informática do Sistema Único de Saúde, nos 
últimos cinco anos, identifica-se que as entidades sem fins lucrativos tiveram mais investimento em 
produção hospitalar do que as esferas da administração pública direta e indireta de todos os entes. A 
título de contribuição para a busca de soluções para o problema, conclui-se que a menor participação 
da gestão nacional do Sistema Único de Saúde na prestação de serviços de saúde acarreta maior 
compra de serviços da iniciativa privada pelos entes, descumprindo a determinação constitucional 
de complementariedade da participação do setor privado no Sistema Único de Saúde. Ademais, 
a prestação de serviços hospitalares nesses moldes promove a falta de equilíbrio na alocação de 
leitos hospitalares, o que compromete a igualdade de condições no acesso às ações e aos serviços 
de saúde, objetivo da descentralização, e o adequado funcionamento do Sistema Único de Saúde.
Palavras-Chave 
Descentralização; Rede Hospitalar; Sistema Único de Saúde.
219
Decentralization of public health services in hospital care
R. Dir. sanit., São Paulo v.20 n.3, p. 217-239, nov. 2019/fev. 2020
Introduction
In order to achieve universality and equality in access to health actions and 
services, as well as the reduction of diseases and inequalities - objectives of public 
social and economic policies -, the Federal Constitution of 1988 (CF/88)1 designed 
a public health system that valued prevention and was integral, unique and free. 
The organization of actions within this public system, established by CF/88, would 
occur in a regionalized and hierarchical network. This network would be structured 
around decentralized actions and comprehensive service, with the participation of 
the community.
Furthermore, a complex health system could not be built without an ade-
quate interpretation of these characteristics that the Brazilian constitutional model 
determined for health. In this sense, it is important that scholars from the Brazil-
ian National Health System (SUS), as well as those who are part of it, are willing to 
debate the most current and practical arguments and issues that arise about public 
health in Brazil. In this regard, it is appropriate to address, even with critical nuances, 
SUS guidelines such as regionalization - considering that the World Bank’s rec-
ommendations for Brazil in 2017 arouse reflections about the limits of local health 
care networks and how they can be, to some extent, harmful especially in smaller 
municipalities - and the hierarchization - as the division of health competencies 
can collaborate with better health provision.
The revision of the criteria for apportionment among federal entities based 
on their health responsibilities is a goal of Objective 13 of the National Health Plan 
(2016-2019)2, which is “to improve the spending pattern, qualify tripartite financing 
and the transfer of resources process, in the perspective of the stable and sustainable 
financing of the SUS”.
This work is part of a bibliographic search in the literature of Health and 
Administrative Law that deals with the guidelines of the SUS, together with the 
research and analysis of data available in the Hospital Information System of the 
SUS (SIH/SUS), via public data tab developed by the Informatics Department of 
the SUS (TABNET-DATASUS)3, about medium and high complexity expenses with 
hospital services, according to the legal nature of the production owner (direct and 
indirect public administration of all entities and non-profit entities), in the period 
between January 2014 and September 2018. With this, it propose to discuss the 
nuances of the decentralization of the health care network and to study the reflexes 
1 BRASIL. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/
ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicaocompilado.htm. Accessed on: 11 Dec. 2019.
2 MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE – MS. Plano Nacional de Saúde: PNS 2016-2019. Brasília-DF: 2016. p. 89. Available 
at: http://bvsms.saude.gov.br/bvs/publicacoes/plano_nacional_saude_2016_2019_30032015_final.pdf.
3 MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE - MS. Sistema de Informações Hospitalares do SUS (SIH/SUS). DATASUS. Available 
at: http://tabnet.datasus.gov.br/cgi/tabcgi.exe?sih/cnv/qgbr.def. Accessed on: 21 Nov. 2018.
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of the municipalization of medium and high complexity health services in the hos-
pital production acquired by the SUS with the private non-profit sector, limited to 
hospital production ceilings without really considering local health needs.
In this sense, the work questions what is the panorama of the service hiring of 
private hospital by the SUS during the period examined, and how the largest private 
hospital production stems from the removal of national and state directions from 
the execution of health services, delegating health management to municipalities, 
regardless of their capacity, and then to non-profit entities.
The solutions adopted until September 2018, consistent in hiring the private 
network to supply the absence of public administration services, should not be the 
rule, in order to prevent the public system from being permeable and dependent 
on private initiative.
I. Regionalization and hierarchization as a mark of the decentralization 
of the health network
The health system proposes to be unique, however regionalized, at the 
organization level, and hierarchized, in order to assist its functioning in the most 
diverse service complexities. In addition, the organization of the SUS as a system 
traces a certain disfigurement of the federal logic, in which the entities have more 
autonomy: in it, a mandatory integration between the federal entities is identified 
for the coordination and cooperation of the actions and resources made available.
Gilberto Bercovici4 best explains the tone of coordination and cooperation 
in the Brazilian legal system, highlighting that CF/88 is the source of cooperation 
between entities and, although outside the cases mentioned in the Magna Carta 
as hypotheses for cooperation, separation and independence predominate in the 
exercise of constitutional powers. Coordination presupposes that the Union and 
federated entities have the same function, but in different scope and intensity, with 
prevalence of federal allocation5, this being the type of competence to legislate on 
health protection (art. 24, XII, CF/88). Cooperation, in contrast, designates the 
Union and the other entities to exercise competence together with the others, but 
with interdependence, making it difficult for an entity to perform with exclusivity 
or prevalence a given function; cooperation is revealed in the common compe-
tences6, like the competence to care for public health, common to all entities (art. 
23, II, CF/88).
4 BERCOVICI, Gilberto. Desigualdades regionais, Estado e Constituição. São Paulo: Max Limonad, 2003. 
p. 151-154.
5 Id. Ibid., p. 151.
6 Id. Ibid., p. 152-153.
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Considering that a single health system could not be built based on coop-
eration between state entities without an organization mechanism, the CF/88, when 
establishing the bases of the SUS, also determined that the organization of this 
public system be regionalized and hierarchized. Article 198 of the CF/88 presents 
the guidelines, as contours and characteristics, of the public health system, among 
them decentralization, alongside comprehensive care and community participation, 
which must take place in the context of regionalization and hierarchization.
According to Fernando Aith7, regionalization concerns a political decen-
tralization, established at levels of competence of each federal entity, added to the 
cooperation between these various entities. In other words, regionalization is based 
on federal autonomy linked to the consensus obtained in administrative bodies 
created to favor this cooperation, such as the Bipartite and Tripartite Inter-Man-
agement Commissions (CIB and CIT).
Hierarchization, in contrast, is related to the organization of care at differ-
ent levels of complexity8. Care should start from the simplest (primary care, such as 
consultations and dressings) to the most complex (secondary care, such as minor 
surgeries; and tertiary care, such as larger surgeries).
For Sueli Gandolfi Dallari and Vidal Serrano Nunes Júnior9, while region-
alization concerns an organization by territorial constituencies, hierarchization is 
related to an organization at different levels of complexity, in a reference and count-
er-reference system that allows the rationalization of the use of resources, consid-
ering that the primary care unit both performs its case of reduced complexity and 
references cases of greater complexity to a secondary or tertiary service.
Thus, all these contexts of the network express their decentralized charac-
teristic, assuming, consequently, that the services must be provided by the munic-
ipalities except when they have a national or regional dimension. This conception, 
warns Jorge Munhós de Souza10, does not eliminate the characteristic of our federal 
model, in which the Union concentrates the collection, but establishes execution 
responsibilities to entities in reverse to their own investment power – that is, the 
Union remains the collecting entity in essence, but the execution of services, includ-
ing health, must be carried out, as a rule, by municipalities, except those of regional 
and national dimension or when the municipality responsible cannot carry it out.
7 AITH, Fernando Mussa Abujamra. Teoria geral do direito sanitário brasileiro. 2006. Tese (Doutorado em 
Saúde Pública) – Programa de Pós-Graduação em Saúde Pública, da Faculdade de Saúde Pública da 
Universidade de São Paulo, 2006. p. 395 -396.
8 SOUZA, Jorge Munhós de. Diálogo institucional e direito à saúde. Salvador: Editora Jus Podivm, 2013. 
p. 210-211.
9 DALLARI, Sueli Gandolfi; NUNES JÚNIOR, Vidal Serrano. Direito sanitário. São Paulo: Editora Verbatim, 2010. 
p. 83-84.
10 SOUZA, Jorge Munhós de. op. cit., p. 212-213.
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It is identified that the federalism of the health system, in the face of the 
decentralization guideline, can be considered centrifugal (which tends to move 
away from the center), in view of the great autonomy of subnational entities for the 
application of health policies. The federal model of organization of the Brazilian 
State is more centripetal (which tends to approach the center), granting powers to 
subnational entities while still concentrating the capacity of unity in the national 
entity, through its high material and normative power.
Thus, it can be said that, in essence, regionalization presupposes a decen-
tralization coordinated by norms that divide the allocation of the Union, states and 
municipalities in the SUS. Based on the division of the system in terms of complexity 
of services (hierarchization), and even if the Union has greater power of collection 
– and, therefore, expenditures – it is denoted that the national direction of the SUS 
would be more able to afford the financing of high complexity systems and that local 
management would be better able to manage low complexity systems. This is how 
regionalization and hierarchization can be related and harmonized.
The coordination and consensus stemming from the proper understanding 
of these concepts entail the debates and decisions around the CIB and CIT, which 
are collegiate administrative bodies created to favor the consensus that organizes 
the regionalization11, territorially speaking, but also around the types of care based 
on the complexity of the service (hierarchization).
However, the current model of the health system, structured in decentral-
ized networks, does not allow great reflections on the confusion that can be caused 
when regionalization becomes justification for the execution of health actions and 
services almost entirely by the municipalities, disregarding that the hierarchization 
could advance more in the decisions of the CIB and CIT.
Thus, it is important to debate the municipalization of health services, 
notably those that the municipalities are unable to provide, even although the con-
stitutional intention to establish decentralization is to guarantee access to these ser-
vices in the most diverse realities of Brazil and that, for this, the country has chosen 
to assign greater responsibilities to municipalities in the 1990s.
II. The movement of health provision by municipalities at all levels of care
The provision of public health actions and services in Brazil was structured 
around care networks, giving a systemic perspective to health issues. From the 
creation of the system, it is possible to establish health prevention and promotion 
programs and, thus, enable network health actions to be within the objectives of uni-
versality and equity. As pointed out in the qualification manual of the SUS managers:
11 AITH, Fernando Mussa Abujamra. Teoria geral do direito sanitário brasileiro, cit., p. 396.
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In a network, equipment and services do not function in isolation, 
taking joint responsibility for access, comprehensive care and 
continuity of health care for people. [...] For this, it is necessary 
to define the units that make up the network according to levels 
of care (hierarchization) and distribute them geographically 
(regionalization). At a more basic level, there would be units 
equipped with technologies and professionals to carry out the 
services most frequently needed (e.g., vaccines, consultations 
with general practitioners, doctors with basic specialties and 
other health professionals). At a more specialized level, hospitals, 
ambulatories and diagnostic and therapy units capable of per-
forming those less frequently needed procedures (e.g.: cardiac 
surgery, neurosurgery, nuclear magnetic resonance, bone marrow 
transplants) would be located 12.
Furthermore, the organization by health regions is part of the configuration 
of a decentralized health network, which may cover more than one municipality. This 
even stimulated the realization of health consortia, which began to be widely cele-
brated in the 1990s as an alternative for managers for a municipalization “accelerated 
in a federation marked by a large proportion of small municipalities that are unable 
to guarantee in isolation the supply in isolation the provision of services necessary 
for the health care of the population in its territorial scope”13. Still in the context 
of the reconfiguration of health care networks around the municipalities, there is 
the greater participation of the private initiative in public health expenditures in 
the face of the increase in the allocation of health actions and services to municipal 
governments in the 1990s and 2000s14, at all levels of attention.
For no other reason, as Nilson do Rosário Costa15 points out, the partic-
ipation of municipalities in total health expenditure rose from 12.3% in 1995 to 
18% in 2012. The states maintained the same 25% of total public expenditure. The 
proportional share of federal expenditure was reduced from 61.7% to 57% between 
1995 and 2012. The author analyzes that, despite recognizing that SUS has been suc-
cessful in primary care, “it is necessary to draw attention, however, to the fact that 
the Brazilian central government allocates a small portion of the financial execution 
as an incentive for municipalities to develop primary care”16. On the other hand, a 
12 KUSCHNIR, Rosana et al. Configuração da rede regionalizada e hierarquizada de atenção à saúde no 
âmbito do SUS. In: OLIVEIRA, Roberta Gondim de; GRABOIS, Victor; MENDES JUNIOR, Walter Vieira (Orgs.) 
Qualificação de gestores do SUS. Rio de Janeiro: EAD/Ensp, 2009. p. 128.
13 Id. Ibid., p. 135.
14 COSTA, Nilson do Rosário. Austeridade, predominância privada e falha de governo na saúde. Ciênc. 
saúde coletiva, Rio de Janeiro, v. 22, n. 4, p. 1169, abr. 2017. Available at: http://www.scielo.br/
scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1413-81232017002401065&lng=en&nrm=iso. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1590/1413-81232017224.28192016.
15 Id. Ibid., p. 1169.
16 Id. Ibid., p. 1170.
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large part of the Union’s resources is destined to the purchase of high complexity 
services by all entities, including states and municipalities, as highlighted by Costa:
The stagnation of the decentralization process in the current 
decade resulted in 37% of federal health resources being executed 
in 2013 directly by the MS [Ministry of Health] via the National 
Health Foundation, and the remaining 45%, also intended to 
purchase by central, state and municipal governments admissions, 
services, and high-cost medication17.
If for primary care there seems to be a reduction in importance, with insuf-
ficient transfer of resources by the Federal Government to this level of the network, 
for high complexity care there is a greater transfer of resources, aiming at the pur-
chase of services by the municipalities. This disparity, in addition to disregarding the 
greater vocation of municipal entities for primary care, reveals a regional planning 
process that is inadequate to SUS order, with only formal implementation of the hier-
archization concepts and justifying more comfortable trends, such as the transfer of 
service provision of more complex services to municipalities and to private initiative.
According to Technical Note no. 28/2016 of the Institute for Applied Eco-
nomic Research (Ipea)18, the percentage of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
applied to health in Brazil ranged from 3.19% in 2002 to 3.94% in 2015. This growth 
in health investment based on GDP was largely due to the increase made by states 
and municipalities in the financing of the SUS. Health expenditures in the Union 
went from 1.66% of GDP in 2002 to only 1.69% of GDP in 2015. In the same period, 
states went from 0.72% to 1.03% of GDP, and municipalities from 0.81% to 1.22% 
of GDP in expenditures on public health actions and services.
The growth in investments by subnational entities in health has also 
occurred with the use of own resources. It is identified that, in 2004, own resources 
represented, on average, 18% of municipal expenditures in health and, in 2015, this 
percentage reached 23.3%. In contrast, the states increased from 11.9% to 13.5% the 
participation of own resources in the total applied in health between 2004 and 2015.
The SUS service network has also been questioned because of the lack of 
regional planning for defining and ordering of services. Chioro Reis et al.19 point out 
that the expansion of networks occurs from decisions taken separately by the entities, 
17 COSTA, Nilson do Rosário. op. cit., p. 1170.
18 VIEIRA, Fabiola Sulpino; BENEVIDES, Rodrigo Pucci de Sá. Os impactos do novo regime fiscal para o 
financiamento do Sistema Único de Saúde e para a efetivação do direito à saúde no Brasil. Brasília-DF: 
Ipea, 2016. p. 18-25. (Nota Técnica; n. 28). Available at: http://ipea.gov.br/portal/images/stories/PDFs/
nota_tecnica/160920_nt_28_disoc.pdf. Accessed on: 04 Jun. 2018.
19 REIS, Ademar Arthur Chioro dos et al. Reflexões para a construção de uma regionalização viva. Ciênc. 
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followed by requests for resources from the Federal Government in a disarticulated 
way. Thus, they conclude, “it is a ‘wandering expansion’, which does not consider 
planning and regional agreement necessary for the sustainability of the system.
In this context of the health decentralization process in Brazil, a World 
Bank report indicated that most Brazilian municipalities have high productivity in 
primary care even in the face of resource constraints, which influences their low 
performance, according to the indicators of the analysis performed. In secondary 
and tertiary care, the productivity of the municipalities is low, that is, it has little 
efficiency. The report concludes:
Most of the inefficiency is motivated by the large number of 
small hospitals and the small size of the municipalities (which 
are too small to provide health services on an efficient scale). 
Efficiency varies according to location and population, as 
much of the inefficiency derives from the small size of hospi-
tals (less than 100 beds), which impairs their efficiency. In fact, 
the Brazilian health system is characterized by a large number 
of small hospitals, which were built to provide services in less 
urbanized regions. Most Brazilian hospitals operate on a small 
scale, and 61% have fewer than 50 beds (the estimated ideal 
size is 150 to 200 beds for economies of scale). Bed occupancy 
rates are also very low: on average, 45% in the SUS hospitals, 
and only 37% in intensive care units. These figures are well 
below the OECD averages (71%) and the desirable occupancy 
rate (between 75% and 85%)20.
With regard to hospital care, the manual for SUS managers highlights that 
the other components of the network influence the performance of hospitals, espe-
cially that “the characteristics of the first level of care - the level of coverage achieved, 
accessibility, degree of resolution - determine the demand that will be generated for 
the care performed in hospitals”21.
Hence the importance of municipalities fulfilling their demand in primary 
care, considering that success in activities at the basic level impacts hospital demands. 
However, there is a big difference in the configuration of health regions, considering 
that there are smaller municipalities and municipalities that meet the demands of 
populations from the most diverse locations, including other municipalities and 
states, known as “city-states”.
20 UM AJUSTE justo: análise da eficiência e equidade do gasto público no Brasil. Brasil: revisão das despesas 
públicas. Brasília-DF: Grupo Banco Mundial, 2017. p. 115. Relatório elaborado por uma equipe do Banco 
Mundial chefiada por Antonio Nucifora (Economista-Chefe para o Brasil, Banco Mundial). Available at: http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/884871511196609355/pdf/121480-REVISED-PORTUGUESE-
Brazil-Public-Expenditure-Review-Overview-Portuguese-Final-revised.pdf. Accessed on: 14 Dec. 2017.
21 KUSCHNIR, Rosana et al. op. cit., p. 150.
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However, it can be seen that the movement of the municipalization of 
health services at all levels of care did not observe these particularities and ended up 
developing the same health bases that exist in the social security model. Vasconce-
los and Pasche22 point to the maintenance of the centralized and permeable nature 
to market interests in health institutions, although incompatible with SUS, which 
made the decentralization of health services in favor of the municipalities occur 
in a contradictory way, considering that the resources and control of the system 
remained centralized at the federal sphere. Additionally, the contradiction also 
affects the execution of high hospital complexity services, as discussed in this paper.
Since the administration of system resources is still centralized and with 
a low investment grade by the federal sphere, the performance of the services is 
hampered, especially those more expensive, that the municipalities would not have 
structure to perform, such as health services of high hospital complexity.
Therefore, it is essential to make critical readings about the decentraliza-
tion process of public health services in the context of the gradual decrease in the 
participation of national in the system, which can damage the configuration of the 
SUS itself, as we approach next.
III. Issues arising from the decentralization of hospital care on the way to 
municipalization
Before the interpretation given to the constitutional guideline for the decen-
tralization of the health care network, as discussed in the previous topics, it is neces-
sary to reflect what is the participation measure of the municipalities in the SUS. One 
consequence that can be pointed in face of the municipalization of health services, 
especially secondary attention and the tertiary one, is the large number of hospital 
services financed with medium and high complexity (MAC) resources performed 
by non-profit entities without lucrative ends (private foundation, autonomous social 
service, trade union entity, religious organization and private association). In analysis of 
the data contained in SIH/SUS for the last five years, available in DATASUS, identifies 
that the value of the SUS resources destined to non-profit entities for hospital care is 
higher than that applied by the direct and indirect public administration of all entities.
Analyzing the data from SUS23hospital procedure, between January 2014 
and September 2018, with the criteria “legal nature”24, “year/month of processing”, 
22 VASCONCELOS, Cipriano Maia de; PASCHE, Dário Frederico. O Sistema Único de Saúde. In: CAMPOS, 
Gastão Wagner de Sousa et al. Tratado de saúde coletiva. São Paulo: Hucitec, 2006. p. 554.
23 MINISTÉRIO DA SAÚDE - MS. Sistema de Informações Hospitalares do SUS (SIH/SUS), cit.
24 The legal spheres correspond to the first level of this classificatioņão, with details of the government sphere, 
when applicable: administração public: federal, state or Federal District, municipal and others; business 
entities: public or mixed company and other business entities; non-profit entities; physical person; 
extraterritorial institutions; unspecified or ignored.
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“hospital services value”, non-profit entities had more investment in medium and 
high hospital complexity production than the spheres of direct and indirect public 
administration of all entities. From January to September 2018, private associations 
and other non-profit entities received between 10% and 12% more investments in 
hospital production than the direct administration units. In 2017, this difference 
was lower, varying between 3.8% and 10%, as pointed in Table 1.
Table 1. Values of hospital services per year/month of processing, according to legal nature of the 
recipient, in 2017 and 2016.
Year/Month Legal nature: public administration (R$)
Legal nature: non-profit 
entities (R$)
Higher payment for 
non-profit entities (%)
2018
September 419.466.642,40 473.957.948,34 12,99%
August 450.676.494,70 498.943.534,64 10,71%
July 445.239.849,13 499.366.017,66 12,16%
June 435.645.907,74 488.322.238,12 12,09%
May 442.340.368,17 488.185.770,91 10,36%
April 432.731.256,18 484.698.629,69 12,01%
March 428.429.893,54 477.489.335,90 11,45%
February 401.365.946,16 442.724.293,21 10,30%
January 422.196.068,21 466.785.725,06 10,56%
Monthly average 430.899.158,47 480.052.610,39
2017
December 381.374.933,83 422.904.351,58 10,89%
November 396.508.948,89 426.428.066,83 7,55%
October 410.964.364,43 428.341.269,73 4,23%
September 403.554.916,73 432.992.241,38 7,29%
August 422.141.502,90 439.977.715,46 4,23%
July 416.793.899,35 440.707.495,59 5,74%
June 407.409.451,87 429.709.186,37 5,47%
May 423.908.545,79 445.300.336,69 5,05%
April 386.719.846,98 410.563.431,12 6,17%
March 411.173.548,19 426.871.920,54 3,82%
February 365.019.892,47 394.101.989,25 7,97%
January 385.143.903,52 411.322.628,91 6,80%
Monthly average 400.892.812,91 425.768.386,12
Source: Hospital Information System (SIH/SUS) consolidated in DATASUS.
Own elaboration.
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In 2016, non-profit entities received, in January, 23% of higher payments 
than public sector entities in hospital production. In 2015, in December, the per-
centage difference higher investments of MAC in private hospital care in relation 
to public administration reached 31%. In 2014, the greater proportion of payments 
to the private sector of hospital production was identified; make up to 39% more 
than the expenses in the direct and indirect administrations of all entities, which 
occurred in December, as detailed in the Table 2.
Table 2. Values of hospital services per year/month processing according to legal nature of the recipient, 
in 2014, 2015 and 2016.
Year/Month Legal nature: public administration (R$)
Legal nature: non-profit 
entities (R$)
Higher payment for 
non-profit entities (%)
2016
December 387.060.385,67 456.337.250,32 17,90%
November 386.420.567,41 447.953.532,84 15,92%
October 395.523.799,00 462.139.000,50 16,84%
September 407.251.815,94 451.682.602,71 10,91%
August 430.749.529,02 468.079.013,70 8,67%
July 415.130.736,09 469.406.816,69 13,07%
June 417.903.451,05 462.798.259,42 10,74%
May 388.002.746,84 473.204.095,95 21,96%
April 382.031.516,82 460.095.559,25 20,43%
March 380.189.101,95 469.141.478,58 23,40%
February 360.506.927,64 437.990.163,17 21,49%
January 360.711.159,83 446.176.089,13 23,69%
Monthly average 392.623.478,105 458.750.321,855
2015
December 347.798.697,14 457.823.264,97 31,63%
November 364.832.454,32 466.211.359,12 27,79%
October 373.274.699,86 467.144.423,52 25,15%
September 375.542.561,95 481.435.470,46 28,20%
August 384.722.068,32 480.393.829,62 24,87%
July 387.552.735,19 488.636.088,58 26,08%
June 375.878.801,17 476.463.492,86 26,76%
May 371.191.921,84 471.546.674,70 27,04%
April 364.680.432,54 459.108.437,37 25,89%
March 357.808.877,00 465.350.375,33 30,06%
February 338.743.274,82 428.764.651,83 26,58%
January 347.843.410,97 447.934.053,03 28,77%
Monthly average 365.822.494,59 465.901.010,11
Continue
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Year/Month Legal nature: public administration (R$)
Legal nature: non-profit 
entities (R$)
Higher payment for 
non-profit entities (%)
2014
December 322.755.460,04 450.680.141,86 39,64%
November 347.789.872,92 461.355.413,49 32,65%
October 362.153.905,05 478.586.164,35 32,15%
September 361.388.515,97 476.110.551,69 31,74%
August 365.978.771,79 480.240.572,07 31,22%
July 363.135.748,85 479.564.274,92 32,06%
June 339.853.586,26 453.871.524,01 33,55%
May 359.632.192,85 460.429.228,88 28,03%
April 325.911.549,08 439.739.556,60 34,93%
March 332.565.708,38 422.460.159,51 27,03%
February 324.916.055,53 421.072.702,80 29,59%
January 343.288.270,52 429.189.538,48 25,02%
Monthly average 345.780.803,10 454.441.652,38
Source: Hospital Information System (SIH/SUS) consolidated in DATASUS.
Own elaboration.
Note from this analysis that, in the face of a tendency of providing hospital 
health care by the private sector, there is a rupture of the complementarity provided 
by CF/88. Thus, it is argued that the movements of hospital services provided by 
the SUS, by private entities and the regionalization of the system, which is increas-
ingly localized, are phenomena with reciprocal implications. If the responsibility 
for hospital services is fragmented, the private initiative will eventually be more 
contracted as a consequence, given that the smaller municipalities are not able to 
perform, actions and services of medium and high hospital complexity, having to 
hire them from philanthropic institutions in general.
Analyzing the tendency of public services, notably the privatization of essen-
tial services, Nuria Cunill Grau25 highlights that, in countries that have undertaken 
reforms, two sectors active in health and education are identified: a large private 
sector, and a small public sector, supported by direct payments and that finances 
the first. Thus, the experience of services that were transferred to execution at the 
subnational level tended to favor private initiative, either by delegating the execution 
25 GRAU, Nuria Cunill. O que tem acontecido com o público nos últimos trinta anos? Balanços e perspectivas. 
Trad. José Geraldo Leandro Gontijo e Telma Menicucci. In: GONTIJO, José Geraldo Leandro et al. Gestão e 
políticas públicas no cenário contemporâneo. Rio de Janeiro: Editora Fiocruz, 2016. p. 330.
Continuation
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of services or by privatization, “or were even more fragile, behind the figure of shared 
financing, impossible to be assumed by municipalities or poor local entities”26.
In this regard, the World Bank report27 produced in 2017 pointed out that 
Brazil spends poorly and unevenly on health, indicating that this inefficiency results 
mainly from fragmentation of the public health system, especially the high number 
of small hospitals, which prevents economies of scale in the provision of services.
Even if this investigation by the World Bank is contested about the poor 
distribution of hospital beds in Brazil, in view of the well-known capacity problem 
in hospitals in large centers, it cannot be said that the investment grade in private 
health to perform hospital services, as highlighted in Tables 1 and 2, is irrelevant data.
If each entity assumed the execution of its health care responsibilities, the 
significant transfer of hospital care to the private sector would be avoided, con-
sidering that the fragmentation of specialized services is not very efficient. In the 
most diverse realities existing in Brazil, not all local public services can satisfactorily 
perform the provision of health care in specialized care (secondary and tertiary), 
either due to the lack of physical and technological structure, either because of a 
lack of financial and personnel resources.
It is clear that a proposal to improve the hospital care network by iden-
tifying the capacity of certain municipalities to maintain and manage hospital 
units or hospital care services does not mean breaking with regionalization, a 
principle of the SUS expressed in Article 198 of the CF/88. Despite the questions 
surrounding the intentions of the World Bank in the development of social rights, 
it is undeniable that having a more efficient health system is the intention of the 
defenders of the SUS. As Ocke-Reis questions, “after all, who would argue against 
introducing a government program or hospital service that is cheaper, compre-
hensive and effective?”28
In fact, in order to avoid the misuse of beds in small hospitals and also 
the lack of beds in other hospitals (a problem not mentioned by the World Bank, 
but common in the reality of health institutions), it is important that first beds 
are built in larger size hospitals that can absorb the demands of smaller hospitals 
and overcome the problem of location. It should be noted, therefore, that the con-
clusion of the World Bank, even those that can reinforce the adoption of a good 
strategy in the management of the SUS, must be carefully analyzed, considering 
26 GRAU, Nuria Cunill. op. cit., p. 350.
27 UM AJUSTE justo: análise da eficiência e equidade do gasto público no Brasil. Brasil: revisão das despesas 
públicas, cit.
28 OCKE-REIS, Carlos Octávio. Os problemas de gestão do SUS decorrem também da crise crônica de 
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that they can lead to a discourse on reduction of funding the importance of the 
SUS, which is unacceptable.
It cannot be believed that simply closing small hospitals29 will improve the 
provision of public health services if the resources are not used to build and equip 
hospitals that are proven to be most necessary, thus reducing the hiring of private 
initiative for these demands. A clue to the needs for investment in hospital care may 
be exactly where and in what type of service is hire most from the private sector.
Jonh Lister30 points out that the World Bank data, in general and not 
only in the Brazilian case, provide a single total of hospital beds of all kinds, 
for acute cases, prolonged hospitalizations, maternity, psychiatry and special-
ized facilities, and should therefore be analyzed with caution. The efficiency of 
simple reduction of beds is, therefore, questionable due to the lack of analysis 
on which beds need to be reduced and also on the increase of costs in larger 
hospitals. In addition, the same author points out that the reduction of beds in 
poorer countries represented an absolute cut in the provision of medical care, 
without considering health needs.
That is, the improvement in the distribution of beds can be a contributory 
measure to SUS, but rather it requires investment from the State, which may, at first, 
generate an increase in expenses, but that will be compensated with the best and 
most adequate allocation of beds in hospital units in Brazil, consequently without 
it being so directly dependent on the beds of the private initiative.
Ocké-Reis points out that, “in fact, the increase in efficiency should not be 
taken as an excuse to cut financial or organizational resources from SUS, as well as 
queues in a universal health system cannot serve to restrict access”31. On the con-
trary, improving the efficiency of the system may require increased investments.
Furthermore, sanitary federalism can hide an inertia in the health respon-
sibility of all entities, including because, under the pretext of decentralization, some 
studies32 have already argued that the sanitary cooperation leads to centralization 
29 RAMALHO, Guilherme. Brasil perde 34 mil leitos hospitalares do SUS em oito anos: a diminuição significou 
queda de 10% no total de leitos entre 2010 e 2018. As informações são do Cadastro Nacional de 
Estabelecimentos de Saúde. 2018. G1, 09 maio 2018. Available at: https://g1.globo.com/ciencia-e-saude/
noticia/brasil-perde-34-mil-leitos-hospitalares-do-sus-em-oito-anos.ghtml. Accessed on: 11 May. 2018.
30 LISTER, Jonh. Perguntas equivocadas, respostas equivocadas. In: LISTER, Jonh et al. ¿Por nuestra salud? 
La privatización de los servicios sanitarios. Madrid: Traficantes de Sueños, 2010. p. 25.
31 OCKE-REIS, Carlos Octávio. op. cit., p. 613-622.
32 RIBEIRO, José Mendes; MOREIRA, Marcelo Rasga; OUVERNEY, Assis Mafort; SILVA, Cosme Marcelo Furtado 
Passos da. Políticas de saúde e lacunas federativas no Brasil: uma análise da capacidade regional de 
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of the decisions on investments in the mayors and governors, besides low account-
ability of federal entities for the results observed.
Another major factor resulting from the municipalization of health services 
is the possibility of masking policies to cut social spending. Luciana Dias de Lima33, 
analyzing the federal pact in conjunction with the financial logic of the State (power 
to tax and power to spend), states that there is a tendency to shift spending power 
to the peripheral levels of the federal organization, but points out that decentral-
ization does not necessarily lead to expenditure restraint, since subnational entities 
can expand the offer of services and generate more expenses.
Thus, the proposal for a review of the distribution of beds in Brazil, besides 
not being an idea that would challenge the guideline for the regionalization of 
health networks, aims at fulfilling the hierarchization of the public health service, 
considering that the location of services under the responsibility of the minor 
entity (municipality) is not always the most appropriate, being better performed 
by the major entity, that is, state or federal. In this regard, the hierarchization 
allowed, even, the division of the treatment specialties into low, medium and 
high complexity. Thus, the idea gains reinforcement when analyzing the division 
of competences carried out by Law no. 8.080/199034. When this law establishes 
the attributions of the national, state and municipal directorates of the SUS, spe-
cifically in the items dealing with hospital care, it can be identified that the high 
complexity care network cannot be attributed to local administration, being the 
responsibility of the national administration to define and coordinate this network. 
The state administration is responsible for identifying referral hospitals and man-
aging highly complex public systems. For the local administration, the possibility 
of entering into agreements with private institutions, which can be contracted by 
the municipal entity to provide high hospital complex services, is identified with 
regard to hospital care.
In spite of the fact that it is the competence of all spheres to execute services 
regionalized and hierarchicalized network of the SUS, including local care, it cannot 
be overlooked that hospital care, especially of high complexity, has a role reserved 
more expressively for national and state directions. Otherwise, let’s see the text of 
Law no. 8.080/1990:
33 LIMA, Luciana Dias de. Federalismo fiscal e financiamento descentralizado do SUS: balanço de uma 
década expandida. Trab. educ. saúde, Rio de Janeiro, v. 6, n. 3, p. 573-598, 2008. Available at: http://
www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1981-77462008000300010&lng=pt&nrm=iso. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1590/S1981-77462008000300010.
34 BRASIL. Lei n. 8.080, de 19 de setembro de 1990. Dispõe sobre as condições para a promoção, 
proteção e recuperação da saúde, a organização e o funcionamento dos serviços correspondentes e 
dá outras providências. Available at: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l8080.htm. Accessed 
on: 11 Dec. 2019.
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Art. 16. The national administration of the National Health 
System (SUS) is responsible for:
[...]
III - to define and coordinate the systems:
a) integrated networks of high complexity assistance;
[...]
Art. 17. The state administration of the National Health System 
(SUS) is responsible for:
IX - to identify reference hospital establishments and manage 
high complex public systems, of state and regional reference;
[...]
Art. 18. The municipal administration of the National Health 
System (SUS) is responsible for:
[...]
X - observed the disposition of art. 26 of this Law, concludes 
contracts and agreements with entities that provide private health 
services, as well as monitor and evaluate their execution;
In this sense, an important facet of the system’s national coordination con-
sists of its financing, which cannot be dissociated from the respective need to perform 
the health services necessary to maintain the SUS. However, when the central entity 
of the federation has greater collection power, but transfers the execution of public 
services to subnational entities without the corresponding source of financing, the 
service itself will be impaired. According to Luciana Dias de Lima35, there is a fiscal 
imbalance between the government spheres resulting from the lack of correspon-
dence between the spending power and tax transfers. For the author, imbalances can 
be generated by the high power of central collection, while the subnational entities 
assume charges (vertical imbalance), or by variations in public expenditure in the 
face of different demands (horizontal imbalance).
Analyzing the data on health financing, Ricart Santos36 argues that the 
Union has used some instruments to reduce its investment grade in health, such as 
35 LIMA, Luciana Dias de. op. cit., p. 573-598. 
36 SANTOS, Ricart César Coelho dos. Financiamento da saúde pública no Brasil. Belo Horizonte: Fórum, 2016. p. 109.
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the Untying of Federal Revenues (DRU), which allows the application in a diverse 
purpose of 20% of the resources that should be applied in social security. Thus, he 
concludes that “the federation fined itself unbalanced in terms of health: states and 
municipalities are carrying a greater burden when compared to their respective 
possibilities”37.
With regard to health services, the national administration, when transfer-
ring the execution of high hospital complexity services to the municipalities without 
considering their ability to directly provide this type of health care, paves the way 
for the hiring of the private contracted network, maintaining the remnants of the 
previous health model, whose nature was centralized in the federal entity and per-
meable to market interests.
It should be emphasized that the return to a centralized health management 
in the federal entity is not advocated, but that decentralization is better structured so 
that health services are guaranteed according to constitutional guidelines, including 
the complementary participation of the private sector and the division of health 
competences among all entities.
In summary, health services must be based on decentralization in order to 
reach the largest possible number of people, that is, every health service must be 
based on this guideline. For this purpose, the network that gathers all these services 
is organized in order to be regionalized and the services, hierarchized according to 
the level of complexity, also characterized by the “executive synchronization between 
the components of the Federation” 38 in the field of health.
Traditionally, especially after the Basic Operating Standard of 1996 (NOB 
96), the logic of political and administrative decentralization within the SUS is the 
transfer to the municipalities of the role of directly carrying out most of the actions 
and health services for people who live in their territory or to hire third parties to 
do so, with states having the function of promoting the harmonization, integration 
and modernization of municipal systems39.
What is proposed is that the hierarchical division of health competences 
may justify a reallocation of responsibilities, especially when talking about high hos-
pital complexity under the responsibility of the municipalities. Thus, it is believed 
that SUS needs lasting solutions that observe health needs, in addition to electoral 
periods or mere political management, identifying that the decentralization of the 
37 Id. Ibid., p. 112.
38 SIQUEIRA, Cláudia Aguiar. O município e a saúde: reflexões sobre as balizas impostas pelo ordenamento 
jurídico vigente para a atuação do poder público local. Revista de Direito Sanitário, São Paulo, v. 4, n. 1, 
p. 41-49, mar. 2003. Available at: http://www.revistas.usp.br/rdisan/article/view/82416/85402.
39 AITH, Fernando Mussa Abujamra. A saúde como direito de todos e dever do Estado: o papel dos poderes 
Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário na efetivação do direito à saúde no Brasil. In: AITH, Fernando et al. (Orgs.) 
Direito sanitário: saúde e direito, um diálogo possível. Belo Horizonte: ESP-MG, 2010. p. 91.
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guideline of the SUS should favor universal and equal access to health services. 
public health actions and services, and not the realization of services limited to 
production ceilings of private sector.
Final Considerations
From the CF/88 we can read that public health actions and services integrate 
a regionalized and hierarchized network and constitute a single system. However, 
it should be questioned, from a critical perspective, what limits should be given to 
the decentralization of services in order not to convert regionalization into munic-
ipalization of all levels of health care, including care that municipalities, especially 
smaller ones, would not have the operational conditions and adequate structure 
to provide. This leads to the hiring of the private network of services, which is no 
longer complementary (art. 199, §1º, CF/88) and becomes one of the main providers 
of public services of hospital care.
In view of the large presence of private entities in this sector and the imbal-
ance in allocation, the structural failure in the provision of hospital services by the 
SUS is related to the regionalization of the public health system increasingly localized. 
Given these elements, the more fragmented is the responsibility for hospital services, 
the more private hospitals will be hired, given that smaller municipalities are unable 
to perform, directly, actions and services of medium and high hospital complexity. 
In addition, the capacity of hospital units in large centers it is also identified, with 
demands that prevent a viable and lasting health planning.
These issues are the result of a process of municipalization of health services, 
accompanied by policies to cut social spending by the national management of the 
system. Even if it is recognized that the competence to perform health actions and 
services is solidarity between national and subnational entities, and even though decen-
tralization, with a single direction in each sphere of government, is a guideline of the 
SUS, hospital care, especially of high complexity, has a role reserved more expressively 
to the national and state administration of the SUS. Law no. 8,080/1990, in Articles 16 
to 18, formulates that definitions, coordination and management of high complexity 
systems are the responsibility of the national and state administration of the system.
In this sense, the expansion of health expenditures in recent years was due 
to efforts made more by municipalities and states than of the Union itself, which 
has greater power of collection. This circumstance has great potential to be aggra-
vated by the effects of Constitutional Amendment no. 95/201640, which will limit 
the growth of any federal expenditure for the next 20 years.
40 BRASIL. Emenda Constitucional n. 95, de 15 de dezembro de 2016. Altera o Ato das Disposições 
Constitucionais Transitórias, para instituir o Novo Regime Fiscal, e dá outras providências. Available at: http://
www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/Emendas/Emc/emc95.htm. Accessed on: 11 Dec. 2019.
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The large hiring of hospital services provided by non-profit entities and, also, 
the existence of beds in small units without material and professional structure – a 
reality present in many Brazilian municipalities – generate the need to better discuss 
the decentralization of public health services.
The idea that decentralization would represent greater autonomy of subna-
tional entities – as a change in the existing parameters before the Sanitary Reform, 
when there was intense centralization in public health services– ends up bringing 
distortions to the SUS itself. In certain cases, such as high hospital complexity, the 
promise of regionalization or municipalization of health services functioned as a 
mechanism for omission of the national administration in strategic services that 
needed greater long-term investments.
It is believed, therefore, that there should be reflection around the provision 
of specialized hospital health so that real gains can be analyzed with the maintenance 
of beds under the administration of the municipal subsystem to higher levels of com-
plexity, considering that not all municipalities have the same structural conditions 
to implement and maintain them as the states and the Union.
The discussions proposed in this work, as well as the data collected that show 
the higher expenditure of the SUS in hospital production in the private sector than 
in the public administration in the last five years, intend to open ways and alert to 
an adequate interpretation of the decentralization of health actions, which respects 
the distribution and accountability of public health services among federal entities.
The objective, with the exposure of these data, is to avoid that, because it 
is not possible for the smaller entity to provide services of greater complexity, it 
remains to hire non-profit entities permanently, favoring the permeability of private 
entities within the SUS and breaking with the constitutional determination of private 
complementarity in the public health system.
Based on the research produced, it is concluded that the permanent and increas-
ing hiring of hospital services of those with a private legal nature could not be a constant 
in services of medium and high complexity, as has been happening in the last five years, 
especially since it systematically violates the constitutional pact of construction of an 
integral, universal public health and provided directly by the State. In these terms, the 
need to refer to the guideline of the decentralization of the health care network neces-
sarily linked to the financing and direct management of public entities is reinforced.
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